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ARTICLE
A REGULATORY SCHEME THAT WORKS: THE CASE FOR
A STATUTORY RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION BY
COUNSEL IN MARYLAND RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE
TRANSACTIONS
By: Robert P. Pratz 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The residential real estate crisis underlying the present economic
weakness in the United States has many causes. However, one of the
particularly troubling aspects has been the substantial number of
homeowners in foreclosure claiming ignorance of the terms and
conditions of their mortgage financing agreements. Such claims suggest
the likely inherent weakness of disclosure-based regulatory mechanisms.
Maryland has adopted a regulatory philosophy based on mandated
disclosures throughout the process of obtaining mortgage financing
secured by residential real property. This system is fatally flawed
because the disclosures are required to be made by parties whose interests
are inherently inimical to the interests of consumers, and no provision
exists for assuring that consumers understand the information they are
recelvmg. This fundamental problem makes reliance on mandated
disclosure unworkable.
A better approach is to embrace the virtues of adversarial
representation and introduce a statutory right to representation by counsel
as the primary consumer protection in Maryland's residential mortgage
marketplace. Our common law tradition of adversarial representation in
both criminal and civil proceedings is predicated upon the inherent
reliability of the outcomes, derived from the tug and pull of zealously
advocated interests. This tradition is expanded and amplified by the
ethical and professional duties owed to a client by an attorney under the
Rules of Professional Conduct. The introduction of a professional
advocate will enhance systemic reliability, which, in tum, will reduce the
likelihood of a future catastrophic disintegration in the residential real
1 Mr. Pratz is an attorney practicing in Maryland. He is a 2011 graduate, cum laude, of
the University of Baltimore School of Law. He also has a Master of Business Administration
degree with a concentration in International BusinesslFinance from Loyola University in
Maryland and a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, cum laude, from Charleston
Southern University. Immediately prior to entering law school, Mr. Pratz was the owner and
president of a mortgage lender operating in Maryland. He is presently corporate vicepresident of a title insurance company and has been a licensed title closer. His professional
experience also includes serving in senior executive positions in both the finance and
marketing functions.
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estate market and increase consumer confidence in the security of their
financial arrangements.

II.

RECOMMENDATION

This paper proposes a strengthening of Maryland's consumer
protections in residential mortgage transactions by providing a statutory
right to counsel paid for by the mortgage industry. Such a right would
provide consumers the opportunity to have an independent appraisal of a
lender's offer, and to have a non-conflicted advisor/advocate explain the
duties, responsibilities, and likely costs of a particular proposal. The
present protections - essentially a system of complex disclosure rules proved inadequate to protect the interests of mortgage consumers.

III. A CAUTIONARY TALE
Mr. and Mrs. Jones 2 first entered the office oftheir soon-to-be attorney
in the early months of 2009. Mr. Jones was a truck driver for a national
food service distribution company. Mrs. Jones was an assistant teacher at
a government agency-sponsored daycare facility. The family had a
combined annual income of approximately $60,000.00, and lived in a five
bedroom, three bath single-family home that they had purchased for
approximately $500,000.00 in 2006.
Unfortunately, the Joneses had been swept up in the worst excesses of
the recent real estate asset bubble. For years, they had pursued a
conservative lifestyle and approach to financial matters that had,
ultimately and tragically, become the springboard from which they
plunged to financial disaster.
Prior to the 2006 purchase, the Joneses had lived in a three bedroom,
two bath townhome in Anne Arundel County, Maryland, that they
purchased in the late 1990's for approximately $150,000.00 with a thirtyyear Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insured mortgage. The
couple had a monthly mortgage payment of approximately $1,400.00,
which they paid without fail. As the years passed, and the real estate
asset bubble formed, the value of the Jones' home soared to nearly
$250,000.00. The Joneses also had excellent credit ratings due to their
prudent approach to the family'S financial matters.
Sadly, the Joneses also proved susceptible to the lure of advertising
and the hype surrounding the incredibly rapid growth in real estate asset
values that occurred during the mid-decade. Believing that they needed
to own a larger home, the Joneses began to peruse the multitude of
2 The Joneses are a real couple whose story is summarized here. Their names and
certain financial data have been changed to protect their identities. Otherwise, this is an
accurate account of their experience.
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mortgage financing offers they were receiving from the servicer of their
loan, Countrywide Home Loans. Simultaneously, the Joneses put their
townhome on the market. The couple eventually found a newconstruction home that they decided was perfect for them; the five
bedroom, three bath home every childless couple needs. However, even
factoring in the substantial down payment the Joneses would have
following the sale of their townhome, the couple was unable to qualify
for a conventional mortgage of approximately $450,000.00, due to
insufficient income and excessive debt-to-income ratio. 3
Still, there was another avenue open to the Joneses. A Countrywide
loan consultant suggested the couple consider a pay-option arm. 4 As the
Joneses could not qualify under the fully amortizing or interest-only
calculations, the minimum payment option seemed to be the answer to the
couple's dilemma. In short order, the Joneses sold their townhome and
moved into the new home and began making the pay-option minimum
payments of approximately $1,200.00 (net of taxes and insurance). The
Joneses felt that they had reached their dream.
Not clearly understood by the couple, however, was the effect of
making minimum payments on the principal balance of their mortgage
loan. Each month their principal loan balance was increasing by
approximately $1,000.00 in a process called negative amortization. Also,
the loan had a monthly adjusting interest rate that began resetting almost
immediately after closing, making the minimum payment fluctuate.
Finally, the Joneses bought their home near the peak of the housing
market bubble, and paid the minimum down payment necessary to
qualify for the loan. This combination became the witches' brew that
eventually forced the Joneses into foreclosure and bankruptcy.
Pay-option arms have a negative amortization limit, which, when
reached, triggers an event termed "recasting." The most common
negative amortization limits are 110% and 125% of the original loan
balance. When a pay-option arm recasts, the then outstanding principal
balance and the fully indexed interest rate are used to calculate a fully
amortizing payment over the remaining term of the loan. For the Joneses,
the limit of 110% was reached in 2008. The recasting of the loan, then
with a principal balance of nearly $500,000.00, caused the required fully
3
Typically, mortgage underwriting is predicated on the five e's of credit; character,
capital, collateral, conditions and capacity. Income sufficiency and debt-to-income ratio are
measures of capacity.
4
The pay-option arm is a particularly complex instrument with substantial risks to
borrowers. The terms of a pay-option arm allowed a borrower to pay a fully amortizing
payment, an interest-only payment or a "minimum payment." The minimum payment was
typically derived by applying an artificially low interest rate to calculate an interest-only
payment. Borrowers' capacity to qualify for the loan would be based on the minimum
payment.
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amortizing minimum payment to jump to approximately $3,450.00 (net
of taxes and insurance). The Joneses were unable to pay this amount and,
ultimately, ceased making mortgage payments altogether.
The Joneses brought their loan-closing package with them to their first
consultation with their attorney. During that consultation, the Joneses
repeatedly expressed their lack of understanding concerning the terms of
their mortgage loan. They emphatically stated that they would not have
taken such a loan if they knew the outcome could tum so devastatingly
negative.
Yet, in reviewing the loan-closing package, it was clear that the
Joneses had received and acknowledged all of the required loan
disclosure statements.
Their signatures were all in place, and
Countrywide had adequately complied with all Federal and Maryland
regulatory requirements. In short, the Joneses had, in fact, been told
what the loan was, and what it could do. What those disclosures failed to
do, however, was ensure that the Joneses understood, prior to
consummating the transaction, how the characteristics of their mortgage
loan could precipitate such dramatically negative consequences. Simply,
regulation by disclosure proved inadequate to protect the Jones', and
ultimately the public's, interests. 5

IV.

WHERE WE ARE AND How WE GOT HERE

In 2011, it was projected that over 1.2 million U.S. homes would be
repossessed. 6 This represents a 20% increase over the record-setting pace
of 2010. 7 While 2011 is expected to be the high-water mark of the
foreclosure wave in America, foreclosure filings 8 since 20069 have
manifested an increase in excess of 81 % in filings, and an increase of
more than 120% to nearly 2.9 million properties subject to such
proceedings. 10
These increases starkly illustrate the broad, and

5
The Jones' story ends much more happily than it began. Countrywide modified their
mortgage to extend the term to forty years, reduced the principal balance to the original
amount of approximately $450,000.00, and lowered the interest rate to a fixed 2%. The
Joneses are still in their home.
6
Janna Herron, Firm predicts 1.2 million foreclosures, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 13,
2011),
http://cherokeetribune.comlview/full_story/ll 004198/article-Firm-predicts-I-23million-foreclosures.
7 See id.
8
For the purposes of this paper, "foreclosure filings" serves as a term representing
default notices, auction sale notices and bank repossessions.
9
Foreclosure Activity Increases 75 Percent in 2007, REALTYTRAc (February/March
2008), available at http://realtytrac.comlnews/customer/2008.2/foreclosureTrends.asp.
10
Elizabeth Kim, Record 2.9M properties got foreclosure filings in 2010, THE BUSINESS
JOURNAL - MILWAUKEE (Jan. 13,2011), available at http://www.bizjournaIs.comlmilwaukee/
news/20 11/0 1I13/record-29m-properties-got-foreclosure.html.
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implacable, reach of the foreclosure crisis presently confronting the
United States.
The root causes of this crisis are many and varied. Among them is the
widespread slowdown in U.S. economic activity that began in 2006,
including substantial housing price declines. II Prior to 2006, other
factors were crucial contributors. U.S. Federal Reserve monetary policy
decisions following the dot-com era stock market bubble and the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 put unprecedented amounts of liquidity
into U.S. capital markets. 12 This enhanced capital liquidity encouraged
financial institutions to develop high-risk business strategies supported by
low-cost capital. 13
Also contributing to the crisis was the global capital surplus resulting
from ongoing U.S. trade imbalances, which placed substantial dollardenominated reserves in foreign hands. 14 The nations and investor groups
holding these reserves sought to repatriate the funds by purchasing high
yielding, dollar-denominated investments, many of which were assetbacked securities (ABSs).15 U.S. mortgages, mortgage-backed securities
(MBSs) and the more exotic variants of asset-based securities (i.e.,
collateralized debt obligations (CD Os) and credit default swaps (CDSs))
were exceptionally popular with foreign investors and hedge fund
managers. 16 These instruments were aggressively marketed to investors
as vehicles imbued with exceptional safety, due to the fallacious
assumption that the U.S. real estate market would not be subject to
extended, widespread price declines, and that the innovative financial
instruments themselves offered unprecedented amelioration and
management of risk. 17
Further, the relentless pursuit of subprime mortgages by Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac (the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSES))IS in

11
U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., REpORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ROOT CAUSES
OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS, 19 - 21 (2010) [hereinafter REpORT TO CONGRESS], available at
www.huduser.orglportallpublicationsIForeclosure_09.pdj
12
John B. Taylor, Housing and Monetary Policy, Remarks Presented at the Policy Panel
at the Symposium for Housing, Housing Finance and Monetary Policy, sponsored by the
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, in Jackson Hole, WY (Sept. 2007); see also Eric S.
Belsky & Nela Richardson, Understanding the Boom and Bust in Non-Prime Mortgage
Lending 34 (Sept. 2010) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Joint Center for Housing
Studies of Harvard University) [hereinafter Understanding the Boom].
13
Understanding the Boom, supra note 12, at 39.
14
REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note II, at 37.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Heath Aston, Who are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?, THE SUNDAY TIMES (July 18,
2008), available at http://business.timesonline.co.ukltol/business/industry_ sectorslbanking_
and_finance/article4345872.ece; CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
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response to Congressional and Executive branch housing initiatives l9 , and
the simultaneous expansion by major U.S. and global investment houses
of public and private label mortgage securitization, led to explosive
growth in the origination of risky loans. 2o This growth, fueled by an
increasingly fee-based lender compensation system (the so-called
"originate to distribute system,,)21, substantially increased the aggregate
risk subsumed in the market. 22 These factors led to an extraordinary
boom in the housing industry, to the point where housing prices began to
inflate to bubble-like proportions. This boom attracted a host of
unsophisticated consumers, many of whom were first-time buyers.
Additionally, there was a significant increase in the complexity of
mortgage products whose affordability was not easily explained by
lenders. This complexity was difficult for consumers to comprehend,
much less adequately understand. 23
V. How MARYLAND WAS AFFECTED BY THE CRISIS

Maryland's experience during the foreclosure crisis is comparable to
that reflected by national averages, as the state saw a significant increase
in foreclosure starts (defined as the percentage of existing mortgages
subject to an actual foreclosure process filing) from .22% to .83%
between 2005 and 2008. 24 While Maryland's 2005 foreclosure start rate
was somewhat lower than the national average, .39%, the state's 2008
foreclosure start rate was essentially identical to the national average. 25
Further, the growth in foreclosure starts has continued through 2010,
peaking at over 1.4%, and is predicted to remain at elevated levels for the
foreseeable future. 26 Finally, the composition of Maryland's aggregate
OFFICE: FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC AND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE
MARKET 1 - 9 (Dec. 2010).
19
Understanding the Boom, supra note 12, at 109 (discussing the Congressional and
Department of Housing and Urban Development mandates placed on the GSEs to foster
mortgage lending in minority communities and the GSEs response to those mandates to
encourage low down payment and relaxed underwriting origination in previously underserved communities). The discussion also includes an extensive analysis of the inherent
tension created by permitting shareholder owned companies, acting with a United States
government guarantee, to create exotic and risky securitizations, ultimately obligating the
American taxpayer to trillions of dollars of mortgages. Id.
20
REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 11, at 35.
21
Understanding the Boom, supra note 12, at 24. The "originate to distribute" model
began in the 1980s and gathered strength as the markets for MBS grew in the 1990s and the
first part of the 2000s. Eventually, this model would replace the "originate and hold" model as
the dominant system of mortgage origination.
22
REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 11, at 38.
23
ld. at 32.
24
Id. at A-I.
25
Id. at A-I through A-2.
26
Tim Dunne and Kyle Fee, Economic Trends: Changes in Foreclosure and
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mortgage loan pool has the nation's fifth highest concentration of highcost loans - exactly the type of loans most likely to end in foreclosure. 27
By September of 2009, Maryland's subprime owner-occupied
mortgage loans ninety-day default rate was 23.4%?8 The state's
subprime foreclosure rate was 11.4%.29 The comparable prime mortgage
rates were 3.6% and 1.9%, respectively.30 These numbers are especially
alarming considering the relative economic stability Maryland
experienced during national economic downturn. Unemployment rates in
Maryland remained low, compared with national averages, 7.2% versus
9.0% in January 2011. 31 The state's proximity to the national capital, its
highly educated workforce, and substantial population of Federal workers
and contractors has, in large measure, insulated the state from the
extremes of the recession. Further buffering Maryland's economy is the
location of several key Federal government installations within the state.
Maryland is home to the National Security Agency, the Social Security
Administration, Patuxent Naval Air Station, the National Institutes of
Health, and Edwards Air Force Base, among others. These installations
are economic engines providing economic-cycle resistant income
generation to a large segment of Maryland's workforce. Federal
employment provides over 200,000 jobs in Maryland, and accounts for
approximately 7.4% of the state's overall employment. 32 Four of the
nation's wealthiest counties are Maryland counties (Howard,
Montgomery, Charles and Calvert)33, and the state as a whole is the
nation's 4th wealthiest. 34 And yet, despite these advantages, Maryland
has the nation's 10th highest foreclosure rate. 35
Unemployment Across States, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND (July 6, 2010),
http://www.c1evelandfed.org/researchitrends/20 101071 010 1regact.cfm.
27
REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note II, at 29, A-I through A-2.
28
Oep't of Legis. Servs., Fiscal Note, H.B. 1118,2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2010),
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/20IOrsibillfilelhbII18.htm.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. OEP'T OF LABOR, News Release, Regional and
State Employment and Unemployment Survey, 5, Mar. 10, 2011, available at www.bls.govl
news. releaselarchivesllaus_0310201 I.pdf
32
Robert 1. Rehrmann & Theresa M. Tuszynski, Impact of the Federal Government on
Maryland's Economy, OEP'T OF LEG. SERVS, OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, 7-8 (Jan. 2011),
available at mlis.state.md.usI20 I OrslmiscllmpactFederalGov.pdJ
33
Francesca Levy, America's 25 Richest Counties, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.forbes.coml20-1 0103/04/america-richest-counties-Iifestyle-real-estate-wealthysuburbs.htm!.
34
Les Christie, America's wealthiest (and poorest) states, CNNMoNEY (Sept. 16, 2010),
available at http://money.cnn.coml2010/09/16/news/economy/Americas_ wealthiest_statesl
index.htm.
35
Alan Zibel, Foreclosure rate steadies in May; see state-by-state chart, USA TODAY
(June 11,2010), available at http://www.usatoday.comlmoney/economylhousing/2010-06-10foreclosures- may_ N .htm.

194

University of Baltimore Law Forum

VI.

[Vol. 42.2

MARYLAND'S REGULATORY SCHEME

Maryland follows a regulatory scheme for mortgage lenders based on
an initial licensing review, periodic file audit, and complaint response. 36
The primary regulatory authority for mortgage lending is the
Commissioner of Financial Regulation in the Department of Labor,
Licensing and Regulation. 37 Mortgage lenders must comply with both
Maryland and Federal statutory requirements. The Federal requirements
for mortgage lenders are governed by the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA)38, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)39, the
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA)4o, the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRAt 1, and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).42 These
laws generally require disclosure of relevant information concerning the
terms and conditions of consumer financial transactions, and mandate a
forms-based disclosure process intended to alert consumers to the import
of those terms and conditions. 43
The Commissioner of Financial
Regulation's
enforcement authority arises
from
Maryland's
responsibilities under these Federal laws, combined with the Maryland
Mortgage Lending Law44, and other relevant sections of Maryland's
Code. 45 ,
Applicants for mortgage lender licensing are subject to an application
review and licensing fee, a surety-bonding requirement, a minimum asset
requirement, a pre-licensing education requirement, and a minimum
experience requirement. 46 The Department of Financial Regulation relies
primarily on an enforcement system predicated on lender file audits and
complaint response. Audits are scheduled by the Commissioner, and
every licensee must be examined at least once every 36 months, except
newly licensed mortgage lenders, whose audit must be completed within
the first 18 months of licensing. 47 The Commissioner may require any
licensee to submit to an examination at any time, and is required to
36
MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST., § 11-501 et seq. (West 2011) (outlining Maryland's
Mortgage Lender Law).
37
Id.
38
15 U.S.c. § 1691 et seq. (2006).
39
12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2006).
40
15 U.S.C. § 1639 et seq. (2006).
41
15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2006).
42
15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (2006).
43
REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note II, at 32.
44
MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST., § 11-501 et seq. (West 2011).
45
Maryland has a variety of statutory provisions respecting mortgage lending scattered
throughout the Financial Institutions, Commercial Law Article, and the Real Property
Articles. Suffice it to say that the provisions are adequately self-referential to carry out
Maryland's regulatory scheme.
46
MD. CODE REGS., 09.03.06.03, 23 (2011).
47
MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST., § ll-515(a)(2)(ii)(West 2011).
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investigate any written complaint received. 48 The file audits are primarily
ex post facto reviews of lender compliance with the statutory disclosure
requirements. 49 The Commissioner can penalize a mortgage lender, or
employee or agent of a mortgage lender, with anything from a cease and
desist order, to administrative fines, to suspension or revocation of
license, to felony penalties of up to 15 years imprisonment, and
$100,000.00 fines for fraudulent conversion in excess of$300.00. 50
VII.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MARYLAND'S REGULATORY
SCHEME DURING THE CRISIS AND THE STATE'S RESPONSE

As indicated above, Maryland fortunately enjoyed a lower than
average foreclosure start rate prior to the mortgage market meltdown of
2007. 51 It is not entirely clear whether the efficacy of the state's
mortgage lending regulatory system contributed to this favorable rate.
Maryland's regulatory scheme is very similar in nature and operation to
that of most states. In fact, the essential characteristics of the nation's
mortgage market regulatory infrastructure are driven by compliance
requirements in Federal legislation, such as the TILA, and the RESPA. 52
The disclosure regime underlying these Federal laws is founded on the
theory that the provision of sufficient information concerning the terms
and conditions of a particular transaction will ensure appropriate and
informed borrower decision-making. 53 Sadly, when tested in the crucible
of reality, this regime utterly failed to prevent the current crisis, and the
assumption that the provision of information equals understanding was
exposed as illusory. The regime's fundamental nature leads to a
mechanistic compliance that does little to achieve its purported objective
of enabling informed consumer decision-making. In fact, commentators
had begun to recognize that its efficacy was increasingly suspect long
before the meltdown in the mortgage market began. 54 As financial
products grew progressively more sophisticated, the disclosure-based
regulatory regime became increasingly irrelevant as the choices facing
consumers grew more complex, and the possible outcomes of any
decision virtually impossible to assess as to risk and cost. 55 While it may
be true that Maryland's regulatory mechanism was adequately funded,
properly staffed, and professionally managed, ultimately, the state's
48
49
50
51

52

53
54
55

Id. at (b)(1 )-(2).
Id. at (d)(I)-(3).
MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST., §§ 11-516,11-517,11-523 (West 2011).
REpORT TO CONGRESS. supra note 11, at A-I through A-2.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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mortgage regulatory system proved inadequate to the challenge. In fact,
the challenge the system faced was not one that had even been
contemplated. 56
As the mortgage market dissolved through 2007, some manner of
legislative and regulatory response was necessary given the severity and
scope of the meltdown's reach. Maryland reacted in several different
ways. Maryland's General Assembly, during the 2008 Session, passed
the Maryland Mortgage Fraud Protection Act. 57 The Act was passed in
response to 30 mortgage fraud complaints received by the Commissioner
of Financial Regulation in 2007, and an additional 67 investigations
initiated by the Commissioner that year. 58 The Act created the crime of
mortgage fraud in Maryland and authorized criminal penalties. Also in
2008, the state strengthened the licensing requirements for mortgage
lenders by increasing the surety bonding requirements, the net worth
requirements, enhancing the Commissioner's enforcement powers, and
imposing an "ability to repay" consideration requirement in mortgage
underwriting. 59 In 2009, Maryland amended its mortgage lending and
originator licensing legislation60 by incorporating the provisions of the
Federal Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of
2008. 61 This legislation was intended to strengthen mortgage originator
licensing requirements and adopt the Nationwide Multistate Licensing
System and Registry (NMLSR) for Maryland mortgage originators. 62
The state also outlawed foreclosure rescue transactions in 2008 63 , and
modified foreclosure notice requirements in 2008, 2009 and 2010.64
Finally, in 2010, the state instituted a last chance loss mitigation
mediation requirement in foreclosure proceedings. 65

ld.
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP., § 7-401 et seq. (West 2011).
58
Dep't of Legis. Servs., Fiscal Note, H.B. 360, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2008),
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2008rslbillfilelhb0360.htm.
59
Dep't of Legis. Servs., Fiscal Note, S.B. 270, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2008),
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2008rslbillfile/sb0270.htm.
60 MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST., §§ 11-501 et seq., § 11-601 et seq. (West 2011).
61
Dep't of Legis. Servs., Fiscal Note, H.B. 292, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2009),
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2009rslbillfilelhb0292.htm.
62
ld.
63
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP., § 7- 301 et seq. (West 2011) (Protection of Homeowners
in Foreclosure Act).
64
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP., § 7- 105 et seq. (West 2011).
65
Md. R. 14-209.1.
56

57

The Case For a Statutory Right to Representation

2012]

VIII.

197

REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL AS A REGULATORY
AL TERNATIVE

What is patently obvious with respect to Maryland's response to the
mortgage crisis is that every legislative and regulatory initiative was
reflexive and backward looking. While all of the actions described above
may be salutary in the abstract, none of them corrects - or even addresses
- the inherent problem, namely, that the purported advocates of the
consumer's interests enter the transaction with substantial financial
interests conflicting with those of their "clients." In the absence of a
mechanism to independently and actively champion the borrower's
interests throughout the process, the regulatory system will remain
inadequate to the essential task of protecting individual consumers and
reducing the risk that society will have to foot the bill for poor consumer
decisions and unscrupulous lender business practices.
The mortgage financing agreement itself is essentially a hybrid
contract where the parties dicker over some part of the transaction during
the application process; typically, factors such as interest rate, pre-paid
finance charges and term of years. However, this negotiation is not
nearly as even-handed or binding as it may seem. Risk-based pricing,
evaluation of a borrower's income and asset information, and collateral
determination will all affect the final offer the lender makes as to rate,
fees, and maturity. While the borrower is certainly not bound to accept
the offer, the substantial investment of time and effort to reach the final
offer stage virtually precludes the pursuit of alternatives. 66
Moreover, the parties' respective substantive legal rights and remedies
are embodied in the language of a contract of adhesion drafted by the
lender's lawyers, and are not subject to negotiation. 67 The borrower will
not normally see these documents prior to reaching the settlement table.
These agreements typically involve multiple components68 , are too
lengthy to easily read at signing, and are written in the kind of dense
legalese that frustrates understanding by lay consumers. The inherent
disadvantages consumers suffer from this arrangement are compounded
by the fact that the consumer usually is seeing these materials for the first
time, and the setting is frequently a time-pressured circumstance with
mUltiple parties at interest eagerly awaiting the consummation of the

supra note 11, at 32.
Shelley Smith, Reforming the Law of Adhesion Contracts: A Judicial Response to the
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1035, 1041 (2010).
68
A typical mortgage financing transaction in Maryland may well require a note, a deed
of trust or mortgage, addendurns and riders to the note and, in many cases, assignments of
right from the borrower to the lender.
66
67

REpORT TO CONGRESS,
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dea1. 69 It is at this moment when consumers are at their greatest
disadvantage and, therefore, most vulnerable.
As the process is presently organized, there is simply no one at the
table looking out for the interests of the persons ultimately bringing the
money to the deal. Although no regulatory system can reasonably be
expected to eliminate all transactional risk, thinking differently about the
means employed to protect consumers' interests during mortgage
financing transactions may provide Maryland a regulatory mechanism
that portends superior short-term regulatory advantages, and
advantageous long-term societal outcomes without increasing the
aggregate cost of the transaction to the consumer. Rather than attempting
to refine a system that is essentially incompatible with its alleged aims,
and which has proven itself incapable of prospectively ensuring consumer
well-being, I propose that Maryland adopt a regulatory scheme predicated
on active representation by counsel of consumers' interests in
transactions with mortgage lenders. 70
IX.

AMERICA'S TRADITION OF ADVERSARIAL REPRESENTATION AND
THE ATTORNEY IN THE ROLE OF COUNSELOR-ADVISOR

America has embraced adversarial representation since its founding71
as the elemental method in the search for truth in contested matters. Not
only has the adversarial system been instrumental in the development of
American criminal jurisprudence, it has been the lynchpin in the
mitigation of grievances of the disenfranchised in civil litigation as well. 72
While some modern commentators have expressed pointed criticism of
the adversarial system ofjustice 73 , such sentiment is not new. In fact, the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 was intended to
69
Other than the buyerlborrower, a typical sales transaction can have a seller, mUltiple
real-estate agents, one or more lenders and the settlement/title insurance company involved in
the transaction. Compensation for all of these parties will only be realized if the transaction is
executed.
70
While I argue for representation by licensed counsel as the basis of this proposal, there
may well be other professionals with the knowledge and skills necessary to protect consumer
interests in mortgage transactions. Certified Public Accountants, financial advisors or
planners, or even some real estate professionals may be qualified to act as a borrower's
representative. The Maryland General Assembly may well determine that expanding the pool
of available representatives would be in the best interests of consumers.
71
Monroe S. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, I CHAP. L. REv. 57
(1998).
72 ld. at 64.
73
See, e.g., Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L. J. 447 (2009); see also
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Post-Modern,
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 5 (1996); Rosemary Nidiry, Restraining
Adversarial Excess in Closing Argument, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1299 (1996). These articles are
but a sampling of the work devoted to this topic.
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inject equity into the nation's civil litigation system. 74 The Rules were
proposed and adopted in response to disquiet associated with the
commonly perceived "all or nothing" character of adversarial advocacy. 75
Still, uncertainty remained in the courts as to the magnitude of the seachange, the shift toward open-handed discovery (arguably the most
equitable and non-adversarial provision of the Rules) portended. 76
The Supreme Court resolved any doubt as to the role adversarial
values would play in American civil litigation when it asserted
protections approaching privilege of lawyer work -product, fact gathering,
and analysis in its decision in Hickman v. Taylor.77 There, the Court
stated that an attorney's primary duties are "to promote justice and to
protect their clients' interests.,,78 The Court admonished the bench and
stated that forcing the turnover of attorney work-product would seriously
undermine the adversarial system, specifically stating "[t]he effect on the
legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of clients and
the cause of justice would be poorly served.,,79 Today, the adversarial
system remains the nation's primary method for resolving disputes. 80
While adversarial representation is customarily identified with judicial
proceedings, mortgage-financing transactions are not such proceedings.
They can be more appropriately described as semi-active negotiations
where the parties dicker over only a few of the terms of the deal. Despite
this difference, the virtues of adversarial representation can be readily
applied to this realm in the interests of consumers. Freedman describes
this application of the adversarial system outside of the courtroom thusly,
"[a]ny lawyer who counsels a client, negotiates on a client's behalf, or
drafts a legal document for a client must do so with an actual or potential
adversary in mind. When a contract is negotiated, there is a party on the
other side.,,81 This sentiment captures the essential duty of counsel, and
is perpetuated in Maryland's Rules of Professional Conduct, which state
74
Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE LJ. 1,3-4 (20lO).
75
Id. at 4-5.
76
Adoption of the Rules suggested a weakening of the nation's commitment to the
adversarial system.
77
Norman w. Spaulding, The Rule of Law in Action: A Defense of Adversary System
Values, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1377, 1401 (2008) (explaining the impact of the Supreme Court's
decision in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,511-14 (1947».
78
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
79
Id. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion is even more forthright in its emphasis on the
cost that emasculating the adversarial system would entail. Id. at 515-16 (Jackson, J.,
concurring)
80 David Barnhizer, The Virtue of Ordered Conflict: A Defense of the Adversary System,
79 NEB. L. REv. 657,680 (2000).
81
Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalism in the American Adversary System, 41 EMORY
L.J. 467, 469 (1992).
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"[a]s advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the
rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result
advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest
dealing with others.,,82
Despite its virtues, the nature of the adversarial system is at odds to
some degree with the character of the residential mortgage transaction.
The consumer is not likely to seek conflict with the lender. Rather, the
consumer is motivated to find a way to consummate a deal. It is this very
motivation that often induces consumers to take offers they do not
adequately understand, and that may well have been designed to take
advantage of the consumer's desire to complete the transaction. It is here
that the attorney, in her role of counselor-advisor, is in the forefront.
Maryland's Rules of Professional Conduct describe the advisor's role
thusly, "[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the
client's situation.,,83 The wording of this duty, particularly the second
sentence, establishes that an attorney's purview as advisor is larger than
that of a mere legal consultant. Rather, the expansive nature of the
language suggests the advisory responsibility borne by an attorney is one
that requires the contemplation of the totality of a client's circumstances
when rendering advice. This is exactly the viewpoint necessary to ensure
the protection of a client's interest in a complex transaction of significant
value.
X. HARNESSING THE VIRTUES OF REPRESENTATION TO
REGULATORY REFORM

As presently constituted, the mortgage financing system provides no
effective mechanism for ensuring that consumers have adequate
understanding, rather than merely disclosure, of the terms, conditions and
obligations of a particular transaction. 84 In fact, even where consumer
education and counseling programs have been provided, borrower
decision making was not appreciably superior, especially in the face of
aggressive marketing campaigns by mortgage lenders. 85
Statutes
requiring more disclosure, or which further outlaw anti-predatory lending
practices, or which prohibit such lender compensation devices as yield-

83

Md. R. 16-812.
Md. R. 16-812(2.1).

84
85

ld.

82

REpORT TO CONGRESS,

supra note 11, at 52.
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spread premium, or service-release premium86 , will not suffice to fill the
void in consumer knowledge and understanding. The missing element is
a knowledgeable and trusted advisor/advocate whose loyalties lie solely
with the consumer.
As I anticipate the application of adversarial representation in the
mortgage-financing arena, there would be no independent third-party
arbiter, nor would the system alter the current method of utilizing
standardized contracts in most transactions. Further, I am not suggesting
that this system provide a forum for dispute over every point. The
realities of modem commerce are considerations that cannot be
disregarded in designing regulatory mechanisms. The system needs to
support the consummation of these transactions, not thwart them. The
imposition of structures or processes that unreasonably constrict
transaction flow would fatally wound the nation's mortgage financing
system. Instead, what I envision is a regulatory system that harnesses the
energy of representation, the client-centric objectivity of the attorney as
counselor-advisor, and that invokes the duties of loyalty and
confidentiality in the meaningful protection of the interests of consumers
during loan negotiation.
Legislation mandating that residential mortgage borrowers be
presented the opportunity, without cost, to consult with counsel can
provide the means to ensure that consumers have adequate opportunity
and resources to understand the import of a proposed transaction. By
affirmatively embracing the virtues of a representative system as a
regulatory tool, Maryland can provide consumers with an effective and
easy-to-understand mechanism that both the legal system and the
mortgage distribution system can readily integrate. This proposed system
will fill the empty seat at the table that plagues the current system; the
empty seat that concedes the potential for a future meltdown. 87
The attorney as counselor-advisor will provide consumers with an
objective and loyal voice to describe the benefits, costs, and implications
of a proposed transaction. Moreover, the counselor-advisor will be in a
position to discern the consumer's immediate needs, and long-term
interests, and carefully weigh those against the offer presented. This is a
critical component as residential mortgage transactions are complex and
high value, and other parties to the transaction - often with their own
86
Yield-spread premium is commission payable to mortgage brokers for originating a
loan. Service-release premium is commission payable to mortgage lenders for originating a
loan. The difference in the two forms of compensation is that lenders lend their own money,
and are subsequently paid for transferring the loan to another lender, while broker loan
transactions are conducted with funds from the initial lender. Both forms of compensation are
interest and fee sensitive.
87 REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 11, at 32.
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counselor-advisors in tow - may well seek to shift risk away from
themselves and onto the consumer In ways not obvious nor easily
understood by lay people.
Further, by placing a knowledgeable advocate at the consumer's
elbow, lenders will find their loan offers and the terms and conditions of
closing documents scrutinized by an officer of the court. The very fact
that such scrutiny will be required in each loan transaction will make the
overall mortgage marketplace more fair, efficient, and lower-cost by
eliminating the distortions that occur when consumers unknowingly
accept high-cost, high-risk loans to their detriment. Further, such
advocacy on the consumer's behalf is also likely to create competition
among lenders to provide the most favorable terms, transparency, and
processing service; all of these developments will redound to the
consumer's benefit.
Finally, the proposed system will likely provide significant impetus
for the adoption of more easily understood and fairer transaction
documents. Critics of this proposal, most likely concerned about the
impact on lenders, may suggest mandatory consumer representation will
result in intractable negotiation between consumer and lender. Such
concerns are ill-founded.
The form contract has arisen as an
indispensable means for businesses to conduct commercial-scale
transactions88 , and its role in this proposed system of regulation need not
be any different than it is today. There is no need to undertake extensive
negotiation of each and every term of a consumer transaction. Rather,
informed consumers, aided by an impartial and loyal counselor, can
choose between offers (including the terms and conditions of the note and
deed of trust, as well as the rate and fees) that have been reviewed and
explained as to cost, conditions, and contingencies.

XI.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE SYSTEM

It is especially noteworthy that the adoption of this proposed system
should not cause an increase in Maryland state administrative
expenditures. While the Commissioner of Financial Regulation will still
perform the same pre-licensing reviews, periodic lender examinations and
complaint response duties as presently required, the proposed system will
add no new responsibilities to the Commissioner's staff. In fact, the
actual number of mortgage lenders and originators 89 subject to the
88
Shelley Smith, Reforming the Law of Adhesion Contracts: A Judicial Response to the
Sub-Prime Mortgage Crisis, 14 LEWIS & CLARKL. REv. 1035, 1084 (2010).
89
Dep't of Legis. Servs., Fiscal Note, H.B. 944, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011),
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/20Ilrsibillfilelhb0944.htm.In 2010, the Commissioner
had authority over 1,478 mortgage lenders and 5,007 mortgage originators in Maryland, down
from more than 3,700 lenders and 11,000 originators in 2008.
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Commissioner's oversight should continue to decline over time as the
proposed system begins to force, through improved transactional scrutiny
and market pressures, marginal, inflexible and dishonest lenders and
originators from the market. Also, lender disclosure and regulatory
compliance should improve as lenders seek to streamline the lending
process by better ensuring file compliance in the knowledge that an
experienced set of eyes will be critically reviewing the file, on behalf of
the consumer, for discrepancies, errors, and deceptive practices. As
these benefits materialize, the state may well be able to reduce the staff
and budget of the Commissioner's office and re-direct those resources
elsewhere.
The necessary legal resources for the proposed regulatory system also
seem to be largely in place. In 2008, Maryland was home to more than
32,000Iawyers. 9o As of the 2010 United States Census, Maryland had a
population of approximately 5.7 million, up slightly from nearly 5.3
million in 2000. 91 Maryland also has just fewer than 2.4 million housing
units (not all of which are owner-occupied units)92 and 54,605 of those
units were sold in 2010. 93 Although it is difficult to calculate precisely
the number of instances of mortgage refinancing transactions in the state
in 2010, the Mortgage Bankers Association has estimated that the total
percentage typically hovers near 70% of the total market. 94 A simple
extrapolation provides a reasonably accurate estimate of the extent of
residential refinance activity in Maryland throughout 2010. 95
Approximately 127,500 consumers applied for mortgage refinancing
during the year.96 Combined, these numbers suggest that the state's total
mortgage activity was in the range of 182,000 transactions. Even
assuming that merely 5% (1,600) of Maryland's lawyers would be
interested in acting as borrower's counsel, these numbers suggest that
each would have only two to three transactions per week. As it is
reasonable to anticipate that a much higher participation rate is likely,
90
Erin Delmore & Marisa M. Kashino, How Many Lawyers Are There?,
WASHINGTONIAN, (Dec. 1,2009), available at http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/
14534.html.
91
Census 2010 Redistricting (Public Law 94-171) Data For Maryland, MD. STATE DATA
CENTER, http://planning.maryland.gov/msdc/census/Cen20 I 0IPL94-171IPL-total.shtml (last
updated May 24, 2011) (displaying of the 2010 United States Census data, as it applies to
Maryland).
92
ld.
93
Housing Statistics, MD. ASS'N OF REALTORS, http://mdrealtor.org/HousingStatistics/
HousingStatistics (last visited Feb. 27,2012).
94
Refinance Activity Falls, Purchase Applications Steady in Latest MBA Weekly Survey,
MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION
(May 27,
2009),
available at http://
www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMediaiPressCenter/69022.htm.
95
Calculated as follows: (54,605/.30) - 54,605 = 127,411.667.
96
ld.
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there are more than adequate legal resources available to support the
transition to the proposed system. Further, as the mortgage finance
market is substantially depressed from its peak in 2006 and 2007 (as seen
by the precipitous decline in licensed lenders and originators)97,
transitioning in the immediate future is likely to be easier and less
disruptive than it might otherwise be if the mortgage marketplace was
operating near capacity. Further, the addition of an insured professional
subject to malpractice litigation into the regulatory process provides a
social benefit in the form of additional financial resources available to
defray the cost to Maryland's taxpayers in the event of an unfavorable
outcome in any particular transaction. And, as I am not proposing an
increase in the number of licensed attorneys in Maryland, the present
professional oversight staff at the Attorney Grievance Commission is
adequate to the task envisioned. Finally, the proposed system's enacting
legislation should ensure that any attorney acting as a borrower's counsel
may not simultaneously act as a settlement agent, to prevent the
appearance of conflict. As the system is intended to capture the virtues of
the adversarial system and the duties of loyalty and confidentiality,
permitting an unnecessary compromise at the outset is contrary to the
system's fundamental aims.
It is exceptionally likely that this proposal will be manfully resisted by
the mortgage lending industry. The proposed system will subject a
powerful industry (with an exceptionally active and effective lobby) to a
level of immediate scrutiny it is unaccustomed to, and to which it will not
willingly submit. To further heighten the likelihood of resistance by the
industry, I also propose that lenders be responsible for a flat fee payment
toward the borrower's counsel fees. Consumers would be permitted to
spend more than the flat fee, if desired and at their own expense, but
lenders will be required to contribute a statutorily described fee for any
application that progresses beyond initial data collection to the formal
offer of financing stage (the issuance of a loan commitment and loan
disclosure package). This requirement will fundamentally alter the
current industry practice of providing estimates or offers to loan prospects
prior to actually underwriting the transaction. These provisions are in no
way punitive; instead, all they do is continue to place the regulatory costs
of operating a regulated industry upon members of the industry who are
involved in transactions governed by its rules. The provisions are
intended to encourage lenders to more carefully evaluate the risks of
extending credit by closely evaluating both loan applicants and the
collateral securing the transaction. Finally, it is at this point that a lender
97
Dep't of Legis. Servs., Fiscal Note, H.B. 292, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2009),
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2009rs/bilifilelhb0292.htm.
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would be required to provide borrowers, along with the other disclosures
required by statute, an admonition to contact a professional to review the
offer. In order to ensure the independence of the consumer's advocate, I
envision a state registry of certified counselors maintained by the
Commissioner of Financial Regulation. 98 Any authorized advocate could
be employed by a consumer, and the lender will be prohibited from
referring any particular counselor.
As described above, this proposal will likely improve the overall
performance of the mortgage marketplace by forcing lenders to compete
on transparency, efficiency, and, ultimately, price.
While these
performance improvements will surely inure to the benefit of consumers,
the mortgage lending industry also will realize substantial benefits; not
the least of these is a marked decrease in the risk of default in any
particular transaction (due to the factors discussed above) and the
concomitant increase in the confidence of investors in the secondary
market. 99
CONCLUSION

The proposal to co-opt the energy of the United States' tradition of
adversarial advocacy, and the duties owed to clients by counsel to protect
the interests of consumers, should not be viewed as a radical departure.
We trust these systems with matters oflife and death. The very character
of the United States' legal system is imbued with its ethic and its
Constitutional overtones. 100
However, what is clearly evident is that the current regulatory system
proved inadequate to its task, and much of the blame for the real-estate
market meltdown can be attributed to a backward-looking system of
regulation by disclosure. The regime should be supplemented by active
adversarial interactions that would serve as a prophylactic against
systemic disaster, and protect individual consumers from error before
they get into financial trouble. Disclosure is an extremely weak
mechanism for protecting either the entire market or individual
consumers, as was demonstrated by the recent meltdown. The bar is
adequate to the task of providing the necessary help to consumers to
98
As discussed in note 61 supra, the General Assembly may well decide to allow other
professions that can demonstrate the requisite credentials to act as borrower's representatives.
Should the Legislature decide to do so, some licensing would be necessary and could
reasonably be administered by the Commissioner of Financial Regulation. The cost of any
such system could be defrayed by licensing fees. However, it would serve one of this
proposal's underlying considerations to require that any borrower representative must be able
to maintain professional liability insurance.
99
REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 11, at 55.
100 Freedman, supra note 81, at 467-68.
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alleviate the problem, the means are available to finance the
administration of a regime funding legal services in the area, and savings
accrued by avoiding default would likely outstrip any cost increases the
new regime would cause. A mandatory right to counsel in the purchase
of a home - likely the most important financial transaction the average
citizen is likely to make over a lifetime - would be effective and is
needed. All that is required now is the collective will to extend this right
to home buyers and fund it. It is time for the Legislature to take up the
task.

